Bio-energy has the potential to be a key mitigation option if combined with carbon capture and sequestration (BECCS) because it generates electricity and absorbs emissions at the same time. However, biomass is not distributed evenly across the globe and regions with a potentially high demand might be constrained by limited domestic supply. Therefore, climate mitigation policies might create the incentive to trade biomass internationally. This paper uses scenarios generated by the integrated assessment model WITCH to study trade of woody biomass from multiple perspectives: the volume of biomass traded, its value, the impact on other power generation technologies and on marginal abatement costs. The policy scenarios consist of three representative carbon tax policies (4.8 W/m 2 , 3.8 W/m 2 and 3.2 W/m 2 radiative forcing in 2100) and a cap-and-trade scheme (3.8 W/m 2 in 2100). Results show that the incentive to trade biomass is high: at least 50% of biomass consumed globally is from the international market. Regions trade 13-69 EJ/yr of woody biomass in 2050 and 55-81 EJ/yr in 2100. In 2100 the value of biomass traded is equal to US$ 0.7-7.2 Trillion. Trade of woody biomass sensibly reduces marginal abatement costs. In the tax scenarios, abatement increases by 120-323 Gt CO 2 over the century. In the cap-and-trade scenario biomass trade reduces the price of emission allowances by 34% in 2100 and cumulative discounted policy costs by 14%.
Introduction
Reaching the long term 2 • C target -the agreed goal of the UNFCCC Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC 2010) to keep global average temperature increase below 2 • C with respect to the pre-industrial level -represents a fundamental challenge to society. It is extremely ambitious and it might be impossible to achieve. Despite these apparent difficulties and the slow progress of international climate negotiations, there is growing pressure from policy makers and growing efforts within the research community to study very aggressive policies to contain global warming below 2 • C.
The literature explored a large set of technology options to achieve the most aggressive targets.
Without doubts, geoengineering is the most radical solution to reduce global temperatures. According to The Royal Society (2009) geoengineering can be divided into two classes. The first class includes solar radiation management techniques, which leave the stock of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere unchanged but mitigate radiative forcing by absorbing less solar radiation. The second class includes all carbon dioxide removal techniques, which effectively reduce the stock of GHG in the atmosphere.
In particular, it is possible to remove CO 2 either through land use management to protect or enhance land carbon sinks (IPCC 2000; Sands and Leimbach 2003; Sohngen and Mendelsohn 2003) or by using ad hoc absorption techniques. Direct engineered capture of CO 2 from air relies on technologies whose primary goal is to absorb CO 2 from the atmosphere (Keith 2000; Kraxner, Nilsson, and Obersteiner 2003; Lackner 2003; Matthews and Caldeira 2007; Buesseler et al. 2008; Stolaroff, Keith, and Lowry 2008; Eisenberger et al. 2009 ). An alternative way to sequester CO 2 from the atmosphere is to use bio-energy with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) for power generation. Carbon dioxide fixed in biomass through photosynthesis is captured when biomass is burned and it is then sequestered in underground deposits (Obersteiner et al. 2001; Rhodes and Keith 2005; Rhodes and Keith 2008; Azar et al. 2006; Azar et al. 2010; Chum et al. 2011) . Bio-energy with CCS (BECCS) is attractive because it delivers two desired outputs at the same time: it generates carbon free electricity and it lowers the stock of CO 2 in the atmosphere. For these peculiar characteristics, BECCS plays a critical role in many scenarios of mitigation policies generated by integrated assessment models (IAM) (Clarke et al. 2009; Edenhofer et al. 2010; van Vuuren et al. 2011; Rose et al. 2012 ).
The IAM literature highlights three important benefits of BECCS.
First, the use of BECCS allows reaching stabilization target that would have been infeasible without it. Krey and Riahi (2009) find that the 2.6 W/m 2 overshoot scenario in the MESSAGE model is not achievable without BECCS. The 2.6 W/m 2 target was found to be unfeasible also in the IMAGE framework without BECCS (van . Edenhofer et al. (2010) find that BECCS plays a crucial role in keeping GHG concentrations below 400 parts per million CO 2 -equivalent (ppm CO 2 -eq) in 2100. Thus, biomass potential is the main driver of mitigation costs in Edenhofer et al. (2010) . Rose et al. (2012) stress that BECCS would be necessary to attain any level of radiative forcing below 3 W/m 2 .
Second, BECCS makes it cost effective to delay until the second half of the century the adoption of more costly mitigation measures (Krey and Riahi 2009; van Vuuren et al. 2010 ; Thomson et al. 2011 ). Krey and Riahi (2009) find that emissions can peak in 2030; van Vuuren et al. (2010) show that the emission peak can be postponed up to 2060.
Finally, BECCS greatly reduce policy cost. In Azar et al. (2006) BECCS has the potential to reduce the stabilization cost by 80% in the case of a 350 ppm CO 2 target and by 42% in the case of a 450 ppm CO 2 target. Krey and Riahi (2009) find similar large gains from using BECCS.
Despite being attractive and promising, a large use of BECCS raises some important questions about biomass potential and cost, about CCS technological and economic viability and about availability of storage reservoirs.
With this work we focus on the role of international trade in granting access to biomass to regions that have low production potential and high demand. Trade has a potentially large role to play because biomass is unevenly distributed among world regions. Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa have a very large production potential while some regions have very low potential Rokityanskiy et al. 2007; Smeets et al. 2007; Heinim and Junginger 2009; Chum et al. 2011 ).
The importance of biomass trade under climate mitigation scenarios has already been recognized and discussed in the literature. Schlamadinger, Faaij and Daugherty (2004) , Hansson and Berndes (2009) and Laurijssen and Faaij (2009) assess the relative advantages of the physical trade of biomass, the trade of bio-electricity and the trade of emissions permits using case studies or regional energy models. The IAMs IMAGE 2.3 (van Vuuren et al. 2007) , MERGE (Magne, Kypreos, and Turton 2010) and REMIND (Popp et al. 2011 ) include trade of biomass among regions. However, none of these studies has assessed the economic effect of introducing trade of biomass on optimal abatement or on the cost of achieving a given mitigation target.
With this study we aim at filling this gap in the literature by examining the characteristics of a potential global market for woody biomass, the impact of trade on biomass demand and on the optimal power mix and the impact of trade on GHG emissions, using three representative tax scenarios. We then test the impact of trade on mitigation costs by assuming that the longterm radiative forcing target obtained by the central value of the carbon tax is attained using a cap-and-trade policy scheme.
We develop a new version of the integrated assessment model WITCH (Bosetti et al. 2006; ) that includes international trade of biomass. We use the regional biomass supply curves obtained from the Global Biosphere Optimization Model (GLOBIOM) developed by IIASA (Havlk et al. 2011) . The supply curves consist of second generation woody biomass coming from conventional plantations and short rotation forests for each region. The GLOBIOM model also provides the maximum biomass endowment for each region at any time period that guarantees the carbon neutrality of biomass. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 describe the method and the assumptions used for the analysis. Section 4 presents scenarios of international trade of woody biomass using three representative taxes on all GHG emissions and the effect of trade on the optimal power generation mix. Section 5 presents the effect of biomass trade on mitigation policy costs under a cap-and-trade policy scenario. Section 6 presents results of sensitivity analysis. Conclusions follow with a summary of our findings. The Appendix presents a detailed list of equations of the model not included in the main text.
The model
WITCH -World Induced Technical Change Hybrid -is a regional integrated assessment model structured to provide normative information on the optimal responses of world economies to climate damages (cost-benefit analysis) or on the optimal responses to climate mitigation policies (costeffectiveness analysis) (Bosetti et al. 2006; ).
WITCH has a peculiar game-theoretic structure that allows modeling both cooperative and non-cooperative interactions among countries. As in RICE (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996) , the noncooperative solution is the outcome of an open-loop Nash game: thirteen world regions interact non-cooperatively on the environment (GHG emissions), fossil fuels, energy R&D, and on learningby-doing in renewables. Investment decisions in one region affect investment decisions in all other regions, at any point in time. In this paper the non-cooperative solution is used to build both the Reference and the policy scenarios. Since we work in a cost-effectiveness framework, we do not include the feedback of climate change on the economy, which is instead present when the model is used for cost-benefit analysis.
The economy of each region is modeled along the lines of a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans optimal growth model. The model is solved numerically assuming that a central planner governs the econ-omy. 1 In this Section we briefly sketch the general structure of the model and we illustrate equations that describe the power generation and the biomass production sectors. The final good and the oil sectors, together with other equations governing the model, are described in the Appendix.
The economy
The economy is composed of four different sectors s ∈ S: (i) the sector that produces the final consumption good C(f g), (ii) the oil extraction sector (oil), (iii) the power generation sector (el) and (iv) the forestry sector that grows and collects woody biomass (wbio). The standard WITCH model considers only the final good sector and the power sector. We use a more recent version of the model in which the oil sector is separated from the final good sector (Massetti and Sferra, 2010) , we introduce the forestry sector and we explicitly illustrate the role of government in managing carbon tax revenues. We do not use backstop energy technologies that are instead part of the standard version of the model. 2
The final good sector. The final good sector uses capital K g , an R&D knowledge stock K rd , electricity EL, fuels F , labor L and technology ψ to generate output GY f g :
where we omit time and region indexes when no ambiguity arises. ψ represents total factor productivity, which is exogenous and grows at the rate g (n, t). Labor and capital cannot move across regions. Labor is equal to population. The exact functional form used in the model and further detail on the R&D sector are provided in the Appendix. 3
Electricity is purchased from firms that operate in the power sector using nine different generation technologies indexed with j. The final good sector purchases each electricity type separately.
Different types of electricity are mixed using nested CES functions to simulate different degrees of substitutability. The final good sector also directly use coal (F f g,coal ), oil (F f g,oil ), gas (F f g,gas ) and bio-fuels for transport (F f g,bf ). Oil is purchased from the international market. The expenditure 1 Since there are no externalities within each region, the centrally planned and the competitive solution are identical (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003 for fuels other than oil is modeled as a sunk cost for the economy. The price of the final good is used as numeraire: φ f g = 1 . Net output is equal to:
where p EL j is the price of electricity generation of type j, p Fcoal , p Foil , p Fgas , are the international price of fossil fuels and p F bf is the domestic price of bio-fuels. 4
The oil sector. Firms in the oil sector extract oil using eight different technologies, depending on the oil type (from light crude oil to extra heavy tar sands) indexed with v ∈ V {1, ..., 8}. Total production of oil is Q oil = v Q oil,v . Oil is sold on a global world market. By denoting domestic aggregate consumption with F oil = F el,oil + F f g,oil we have that Q oil = F oil + Q oil , where Q oil indicates net export of oil. The international market of oil must be balanced at every time period:
n Q oil (n, t) = 0. p F oil is the market clearing price. Output of the oil sector is valued using the price of oil p F oil and is equal to:
The power sector. Firms in the power sector generate electricity using nine different technologies: oil (EL oil ), coal (EL coal ), gas (EL gas ), nuclear (EL nuclear ), wind (EL wind ), hydro-power (EL hydro ), coal with carbon capture and storage (CCS) (EL coalccs ), gas with CCS (EL gasccs ), biomass with CCS (EL beccs ). We index power generation technologies with j ∈ J. The choice of investments in power generation capacity determines demand of fuels from the power sector: coal (F el,coal ), oil (F el,oil ), gas (F el,gas ), uranium (F el,uranium ) and biomass (F el,wbio ). All fuels are indexed with f ∈ F {coal, oil, gas, uranium, bf, wbio}. Further detail on the power generation technology is given below, where we provide information on biomass electricity generation with CCS (BECCS). Output of the power sector is valued using the price of each electricity type p EL j and is net of CCS cost used by coal, gas and beccs power plants: CCS = CCS coal + CCS gas + CCS beccs . The cost of CCS (C n,ccs ) is region-specific, depends on cumulative storage (T CCS(n, t) = t−1 s=0 CCS(n, s)) and is considered as a sunk cost for the economy:
4 WITCH considers first generation biofuels (ethanol, bio-diesel) that are not traded internationally. The final good sector in developing regions also uses traditional biomass as a direct source of energy. Traditional biomass demand is exogenous and the price of traditional biomass is set equal to zero.
The forestry sector. The forestry sector grows and harvests biomass Q wbio at the region-specific cost (C n,wbio (Q wbio )) subject to the constraint Q wbio (n, t) ≤ Q wbio (n, t). The cost function and the upper threshold to biomass production (Q wbio ) are derived from the model GLOBIOM (Havlik et al., 2011) and are discussed in Section 3.2. Here we note that Q > 0 and Q > 0. The forestry sector sells biomass to BECCS power plants domestically and abroad: Q wbio = F el,wbio + Q wbio , where Q wbio denotes net export of woody biomass. This implies that negative values of Q wbio represent net imports. The international market of woody biomass must be balanced at every time period: n Q wbio (n, t) = 0. The market clearing price of woody biomass is p F wbio . 5 Profits in the forestry sector are π wbio = p F wbio Q wbio − C wbio (Q wbio ) and optimality conditions require that p F wbio ≥ ∂C (Q wbio ) /∂Q wbio , where the latter holds with a strict equality if biomass cannot be traded internationally. The output of the forestry sector is valued using the international price of woody biomass p F wbio :
Trade allows countries with a high availability and low cost of biomass to increase profits by selling biomass abroad. Trade reduces profits of the forestry sector in regions with low availability of biomass if p F wbio < ∂C Q wbio /∂Q wbio .
Aggregate output. Aggregate output is determined by summing the output of the four sectors:
The social planner problem. In each region a benevolent social planner maximizes aggregate discounted utility of households subject to the economy-wide budget constraint. Population in region n at time t is denoted with L (n, t); total consumption is denoted with C (n, t); consumption per capita is then defined as c (n, t) ≡ C (n, t) /L (n, t). Discounted utility is then equal to:
5 The market clearing price of oil and woody biomass is found iteratively solving the model until when the sum of global excess demand is below a minimum threshold for both markets.
where the discount factor R(t) reflects a declining rate of pure time preference ρ v (t):
The social planner chooses investments in final good capital (I f g,g ), investments in energy efficiency R&D (I f g,rd ), expenditure on coal (F f g,coal ), oil (F f g,oil ), gas (F f g,gas ) and bio-fuels for transport (F f g,bf ) within the final good sector.
In the power sector the social planner determines investments in power generation capacity for nine different technologies (I j ). The choice of investments in power generation capacity determines demand of fuels from the power sector and expenditures in operation and maintenance (OM j ).
In the forestry sector the social planner chooses supply of biomass (Q wbio ). Finally, in the oil sector, the social planner determines investments in extraction capacity for all oil categories (I oilcap,v ). The budget constraint of the economy thus reads as follows:
Bioenergy with CCS power generation
Woody biomass is used only in integrated gasification coal (IGCC) power plants with CCS. 7 As for all other power generation technologies, BECCS electricity generation is governed by a Leontief type production function:
where 0 < β < 1 is an efficiency parameter that determines the amount of biomass (measured in energy units) needed to generate one kWh of BECCS electricity. Henceforth we omit the technology subscript when no ambiguity arises. Demand of woody biomass is then:
6 The model is solved numerically using 30 five-year time periods without terminal conditions. The last ten time periods are discarded. 7 Several test runs have shown that there is no incentive to use biomass in standard pulverized coal power plant without CCS. For this reason we describe the model assuming that biomass is used only in IGCC power plants with
CCS.
CCS wbio is the storage capacity needed to sequester CO 2 from BECCS. The total amount of CO 2 removed and stored depends on the carbon content of woody biomass, denoted with ω wbio , and on the capture rate at the power plant, denoted with e: CCS = eω wbio F wbio . By using equation (10) it is possible to show that σ ≡ eω/β.
K measures BECCS generation capacity in power units. η is an efficiency parameter that regulates the number of hours of operation of BECCS power plants. Power generation capacity grows as follows:
where I el is the investments in BECCS in region n at time t, δ is the depreciation rate of power plants and φ is the investment cost of BECCS generation capacity. 8 Finally, operation and maintenance costs (OM ) are needed to run power plants and their demand is regulated by ς.
If the country is a net importer of biomass, BECCS power plants also pay a cost for transporting biomass T C proportional to distance D from major production regions. Transportation cost is paid on the share of imported biomass over total consumption, denoted with γ: γ = 0 if the country is a net exporter, γ = 1 if a country has zero domestic production of biomass. 9
The cost of generating one unit of electricity with BECCS is thus equal to:
BECCS firms maximize profits π EL beccs = p EL beccs EL beccs − C beccs (EL beccs ). Optimality conditions require that ∂ C beccs (EL * beccs )/∂ EL * beccs = p el beccs . Thus:
Optimality conditions in the final good sector require that the marginal product of electricity is equal to its price. In particular, the optimal power mix depends on the relative convenience of the j power technologies. Thus, the following condition must hold:
GHG emissions and climate policy
WITCH considers emissions of CO 2 from fossil fuels and international transport of woody biomass, Abatement of both LULUCF emissions and other GHGs is also endogenous but relies on abatement cost curves. By denoting abatement of LULUCF emissions with ALU and abatement of non CO 2 GHG with AM ghg with ghg ∈ G {CH 4 , N 2 O, S 2 O, SLF, LLF }, and by recalling that power sector firms that use coal, gas or biomass can capture and store CO 2 underground (CCS), total GHG emissions are:
Emissions of GHG are fed into a three-box climate model that delivers GHG concentration in the atmosphere, radiative forcing and temperature increase with respect to the pre-industrial level (see Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni, 2007) .
We consider two policy tools: a tax on emissions and a cap-and-trade scheme, both covering all GHG emissions. In both cases we assume that world regions credibly commit to reduce GHG emissions from 2015.
Carbon tax. In the carbon tax policy framework all countries agree on a uniform global tax T (t). All users of fossil fuels pay a tax proportional to the CO 2 content of each fuel and receive a credit if they capture and store CO 2 . We assume that firms in the final good sector pay taxes on and manage abatement technologies of land use emissions and non-CO 2 GHGs. Tax revenues are collected by the government and recycled lump-sum (LS). When the policy tool is a carbon tax the public budget constraint reads as follows:
10 Q wbio > 0 ⇒ M T R = 0.
The government must run a balanced budget in every period: G (n, t) = 0 ∀ t and ∀ n.
Output of the final good sector and the budget constraint of the economy are transformed as follows:
where C lu (LU ) is the abatement cost of LULUCF emissions and C ghg (AM ghg ) is the abatement cost of non-CO 2 GHGs.
Cap-and-trade. In the cap-and-trade policy tool governments agree on a global maximum level of emissions GM (t) that is consistent with the long term climate target and distribute emission allowances internationally so that n M (n, t) = GM (t), where the upper bar indicates an upper limit. We assume that governments manage emission allowances endowed to the country. Governments auction emission allowances both domestically and internationally -on an global market for emission allowances -at the price P ep (t). If demand of permits from the domestic economy is higher than the emission allowances, the government buys credits from the international market.
Any surplus from emission permits sales is recycled lump sum. With a global cap-and-trade scheme the government budget constraint reads as follows:
In WITCH P ep (t) is found by iteratively solving the model until the international market of emission allowances is in equilibrium at every time period: n M (n, t) − M (n, t) = 0 ∀ t. Also in this case governments must always run balanced budgets.
BECCS under climate policy. It is standard convention to assume that biomass has zero net emissions because the trees recently absorbed its carbon content from the atmosphere. This does not mean that the use of biomass does not cause GHG emissions: emissions arise when collecting, processing and transporting biomass and due to side effects, including effects on other land uses.
However, once at the power plant, biomass should be exempt from carbon taxes. This implies that power plant that produces BECCS electricity receives a subsidy equal to the value of the tax for capturing and storing CO 2 and pays a tax only on emissions associated to international transport of biomass. The price of BECCS electricity is obtained by modifying equation (13) as follows:
BECCS power generation firms are willing to demand biomass subject to the optimality condition imposed by equation (19). This implies that, for a given price of electricity, when the tax increases they are willing to pay biomass more. The price of biomass increases proportionally to the carbon tax: ∂p F wbio /∂T = eω + γ ξD. This also implies that if global demand of biomass exceeds global maximum output, regional social planners are willing to pay a price higher than the global marginal cost of biomass production. As the carbon tax increases the marginal production cost of biomass remains the same, but the value of biomass increases with the carbon tax and thus BECCS firms are willing to pay a higher price on the international market. Firms in the forestry sector will capture the rent.
This is a peculiar outcome of our non-cooperative solution. A cartel of biomass importing regions would be able to extract part of the rents from the forestry sectors of exporting regions.
Assumptions

The economy
WITCH is calibrated to reproduce the observed value of GDP and other energy variables in 2005.
All monetary values are expressed in 2005 USD, using market exchange rates. Population is exogenous and is equal to 9.2 billion in 2050 and to 9.1 billion in 2100; total factor productivity ψ grows endogenously -faster in developing countries -but at a declining rate. 
BECCS
In this section we explain how we model BECCS power plants and we describe the assumptions on cost and availability of biomass. There are many uncertainties associated to the BECCS technology.
First, it is unclear the cost of large-scale power plants with CCS and the cost of storing carbon underground in safe, long-term deposits (Metz et al. 2005; Gough and Upham 2011) . Second, the cost and potential of biomass supply are largely unknown. In particular, it is unclear if a large scale production of bio-energy supply would affect other competing uses of land (e.g. food production and ecosystem), what would be the demand of water for irrigation purposes and, most importantly, the emission balance (Berndes 2002; Rhodes and Keith 2008; van Vuuren et al. 2010; Gough and Upham 2011).
We are therefore forced to make some discretionary choices in our modeling exercise. The implication of these choices on main results is tested by means of sensitivity analysis in Section 6.
Power plants. We assume that biomass is burned in IGCC power plants with CCS with efficiency equal to 35%. The capital cost for biomass-fired IGCC power plants is 4170 USD/kW. 11 The capture rate of carbon dioxide is equal to 90%. Both the efficiency and the capture rate are consistent with other studies in the literature (Luckow et al. 2010, Krey and Riahi, 2009 ). 12
The cost of storing CO 2 underground is region-specific in WITCH. The cost varies according to the estimated size of reservoirs and it increases exponentially as cumulative storage increases. 13
Biomass. For this study we consider only woody biomass from conventional plantations and short rotation forests. Regional biomass supply cost functions are derived from the Global Biosphere Optimization Model (GLOBIOM) (Havlk et al. 2011 ). In particular, GLOBIOM provides the marginal cost supply functions as step functions and we converted them in second degree func- (Reilly and Paltsev 2007; Gillingham, et al. 2008; Calvin et al. 2009; Luckow et al. 2010; Magne, Kypreos, and Turton 2010; Popp et al. 2011) . The divergence in the estimates is mainly due to the types of biomass included (residue, grass, plants, trees) and the assumptions on land use change. 16
Marginal production costs range from a minimum of 3 USD/GJ to a maximum of 40 USD/GJ.
The maximum cost is reached when the biomass sector supplies all the biomass available per year.
The literature uses lower assumptions on cost: Magne, Kypreos, and Turton (2010) 19 For convenience we refer to the tax on all GHG emissions as the "carbon tax" even if this tax is on all GHG emissions 20 We solve the model using a cap-and-trade policy tool with borrowing and banking for a 460 ppm CO2-eq target in 2100. With both when and where flexibility, we find the optimal level and growth rate of the carbon price. The growth rate of the carbon price is then used to determine the three tax trajectories starting from the three representative carbon tax levels in 2015. By focusing on carbon taxes we avoid unnecessary assumptions on the distribution of emission allowances and thus separate efficiency from equity considerations.
International trade of biomass
Results show that the incentive to trade biomass is large. Thanks to trade, world regions efficiently distribute woody biomass and significantly alter the energy mix, thus increasing the efficiency of carbon taxes. The market of woody biomass emerges as a major global commodity market, both in terms of volumes and value traded.
Regions start trading biomass between 2025 and 2050, depending on the tax level, as illustrated in the left panel of Figure 2 . The market starts in 2025 when the carbon tax is equal to 36 USD/tCO 2 in t3, in 2030 when the carbon tax is equal to 28 USD/tCO 2 in t2 and in 2050 when the carbon tax is equal to 32 USD/tCO 2 in t1. In 2050 regions trade 13-69 EJ/yr depending on the scenario. The volume of the market reaches its peak at about 83 EJ/yr. The ceiling on the market emerges as a direct consequence of the cap on global biomass potential and because exporting countries have greater and greater incentive to use BECCS domestically as the tax increases the attractiveness of BECCS electricity compared to other technologies. As the tax reaches very high levels exporting countries reduce supply from its maximum level to accommodate domestic demand.
By pooling all observations from the three tax scenarios we obtain a useful insight on the relationship between carbon price and market volume (right panel of Figure 2 ). Financial transactions connected to biomass trade will increase in value due to either larger exchange of biomass (scenario t2) or growing prices (scenario t3). In 2100 the value of biomass traded in the global market ranges between 0.7 and 7.2 USD Trillion, which corresponds to 0.2% -2% of global output. As noted above, this figure underestimates the potential value of global trade because we consider aggregate regions instead of single countries. Interestingly, the value of biomass traded in the global market becomes similar to the value of oil traded in the oil market at the end of the century: 1.4-1.7% of global output. The oil market follows a downward trend because carbon taxes discourage oil consumption and lowers the equilibrium price.
At regional level, trading dynamics can be explained by the endowment of biomass, biomass 21 Firms in the forestry sector are competitive. The cap on total production acts as a cartel mechanism that allow to restrict global output.
production cost and the carbon intensity of the economy. On the one hand, exporters are countries with the largest biomass potential, lowest production costs and relatively small domestic demand.
Latin America (LACA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are the two largest biomass suppliers, representing almost 85% of exports in 2100 in all scenarios. On the other hand, biomass importers have either zero domestic capacity to meet their national demand (e.g. MENA), low biomass potential (e.g. WEURO) or high production costs (e.g. TE). These three regions represent together 53-78% of biomass international demand by 2100, depending on the scenario. The regional distribution of exporters and importers does not change significantly under different tax scenarios (Figure 3 ).
We find that trading biomass generates large financial inflows in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, where most of global production is concentrated, and large outflows in MENA, responsible for most of global demand (Figure 4 ). Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America receive revenues from exports equal to 0.6-3.6% and 1.1-7.6% of annual regional GDP in 2050 and equal to 1-13% and 1.2-14% in 2100, respectively. In Sub-Saharan Africa, selling biomass would become a major economic activity. The highest financial outflows come from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) the largest importer of biomass. In the highest carbon tax scenario, the financial outflow is equal to almost 30% of the regional GDP (4 USD Trillion) in 2100. While it is easy to understand why MENA would find it optimal to spend such a large fraction of GDP in our scenarios, it is hard to imagine that the policy would be easily accepted by the MENA region. The introduction of trade significantly changes regional production and demand decisions.
Regions with a relatively low cost and/or large endowment of biomass see a surge of demand from other regions. This leads to an increase of the price of biomass and thus to a contraction of domestic consumption. For instance, in 2050, trade changes the optimal supply of biomass from 5-18 EJ/yr to 11-40 EJ/yr in Latin America; in Sub-Saharan Africa from 3-10 EJ/yr to 5-32 EJ/yr, depending on the carbon tax scenario. As a consequence, Latin America cuts domestic demand by 64% in the t2 scenario and by 73% in the t3 scenario; Sub-Saharan Africa reduces demand by 54% and 69%, respectively.
We find opposite results in regions with relatively low cost and/or small endowment of biomass.
However, trade does not necessarily reduce the price of biomass in those regions. In some cases the new price of biomass might be higher than the price in autarky because domestic production might be constrained by the domestic endowement and ∂GY /∂EL wbio > ∂C wbio (Q)/∂Q when Q * > Q.
One example is Western Europe. In 2050 production decreases from 0.7 to 0.3 EJ/yr with the t1 carbon tax, from 1.8-1.5 EJ/yr with the t2 carbon tax and remains instead equal to 1.8 EJ/yrits maximum potential -with the t3 scenario. After 2050 the price of woody biomass increases in
Western Europe while at the same time BECCS consumption increases due to the large imbalance between demand and supply in the scenario without trade.
Middle East and Northern Africa is a special case because the region has no endowment of biomass. Trade opens the possibility to exploit an extremely powerful mitigation option that is otherwise precluded.
The above described dynamics create a substantial variation in the regional distribution of biomass use (Figure 6 ). Trade increases total biomass use and it moves biomass where its marginal product is higher.
Trade of biomass obviously changes the optimal mix of power generation technologies ( Figure   7 ). In 2050 the share of electricity from BECCS increases from 4-16% to 6-29% while the share of electricity from IGCC coal with CCS decreases from 8-10% to almost zero. In 2100 the gap between the two technologies widens: while IGCC coal drops to zero, BECCS covers more than a quarter of total power supply in all scenarios. This is the result of both greater availability of BECCS and of the competition for the same CO 2 storage sites, which increase the price of IGCC coal with CCS. Also the share of gas with CCS declines, but to a lesser extent. 22 Demand of nuclear power decreases in regions that import woody biomass but it increases in exporting regions. For instance, in both TE and WEURO demand of nuclear power declines by 11% in 2050 in the t3 scenario; in LACA demand of nuclear power increases instead by 7%. Nuclear and BECCS are close substitute because they are able to provide base-load power with zero or negative CO 2 emissions.
22 The model does not include unconventional gas resources. The new recent developments in "'fracking"' technologies have quickly and dramatically changed the future prospect for natural gas. We might therefore underestimate the role of natural gas in our mitigation scenarios. 
The impact of trade on emissions
Trade of biomass enlarges the choice set in each region, shifts the aggregate regional marginal abatement cost curve to the right and therefore increases the efficiency of mitigation policy. The overall cost of the policy remains unchanged while optimal abatement increases. However, the question is not if but rather by how much trade of biomass reduces GHG emissions at global level. Trade reduces cumulative emissions by 120 Gt CO 2 -eq in the t1 scenario, by 284 Gt CO 2 -eq in the t2 scenario and by 323 Gt CO 2 -eq in the t3 scenario.
Between 93% and 98% of this additional reduction is due to an increase of emission removal from the atmosphere (the area with diagonal lines) while the remaining share is due to the shift from fossil fuel power technologies to BECCS.
An analysis of the carbon intensity of output in 2100 reveals the importance of trade in a mitigation scenario. At global level trade reduces the carbon intensity of output by 4%, 30% and 38% in the three tax scenario, respectively. Also global energy intensity of output decreases at the end of the century, because trade increases the efficiency of the power mix. Importers reduce their carbon intensity more than exporters as they substitute fossil fuels with bio-energy and store more CO 2 with CCS. For instance, in 2050 TE and MENA reduce their carbon intensity by 55% and by 45%, respectively, in the t3 scenario.
This has a long-term effect on GHGs concentrations: they are reduced by 10 ppm CO 2 -eq 
Results: Emission trading
The aim of this Section is to provide an estimate of the economic value of the trade option in a mitigation scenario. We use a cap-and-trade policy scheme in which all regions agree to achieve a global level of radiative forcing equal to 3.8 w/m 2 . This is equivalent to the level of radiative forcing achieved by the t2 carbon tax. They also agree to reduce emissions from 2015. Regions can trade emission permits on a global market. 23 The level of GHG emissions per year is fixed to the level found in the t2 scenario. Greater efficiency is thus reflected into a lower price of emission permits and lower mitigation permits. In order to provide an estimate of the option value of trade we compare a stabilization scenario with trade to a scenario without trade of biomass.
While the global option value of woody biomass trade does not depend on the distribution of emission permits, the regional economic impact changes under different allocation rules. Different allocation rules would also change the net position of regions on the international market of carbon 23 Banking and borrowing of emissions allowances are not allowed, but there is no restriction to international trade of permits. permits. In some cases trade of biomass will induce an increase of emission trading, in some a contraction. Exporters of biomass will increase demand of permits (reduce sale of permits) while biomass importers will reduce demand of permits (increase supply of permits). Despite being an attractive area for further research, we do not explore here how trade changes regional demand and supply of emission permits and thus regional costs. Since the price of emission permits does not change under alternative distribution rules, we use a representative equal-per-capita distribution of permits to study how trade changes the carbon price and global mitigation costs. Figure 10 shows the effect of biomass trade on the carbon price. In 2030 the carbon price is reduced by 15%. In 2100 there is a 34% reduction: a ton of CO 2 costs 579 USD/tCO 2 when biomass is not traded while it costs 380 USD/tCO 2 with trade.
Biomass trade also changes the optimal mitigation mix, as seen for the tax scenarios. In particular, it increases the amount of emissions removed from the atmosphere and increases GHG emissions by the same amount.
Finally, the introduction of biomass trade increases the overall efficiency of climate policy decreasing stabilization costs. We measure policy costs as the difference between discounted GDP in the mitigation scenario and in the Reference scenario between 2010-2050 and between 2010-2100.
We use a discount rate equal to 5%. Trade of biomass reduces the global cost of reaching the 3.8 W/m 2 target by 15% (from 10 USD Trillion to 8 USD Trillion) over the period 2010-2050 and by 14% (from 26 USD Trillion to 22 USD Trillion) over the period 2010-2100 with respect to the same scenario without trade. This is a sizable reduction of mitigation costs that is comparable to the value of other major mitigation technologies. 
Sensitivity analysis
In this Section we test the robustness of our findings under different assumptions on the (i) the maximum amount of biomass potential (Q wbio ) and on (ii) the transportation cost of biomass. The sensitivity analysis is done on the t2 carbon tax scenario.
We change the maximum amount of biomass potential (Q wbio ) using symmetric intervals (-50%, -25%, +25%, + 50%) around the central value. The cost function is not changed.
The left panel of Figure 11 shows that when the maximum possible production of biomass increases (decreases) also global use of biomass increases (decreases). However, the model is more sensitive to reductions than to increase of biomass potential. The right panel of Figure 11 shows how GHG emissions change. A 50% reduction of global biomass maximum potential translates into about 10 extra Gt CO 2 emissions in 2100. This is a substantial increase (+50% of global emission) that suggests great caution. Although GLOBIOM is quite conservative in estimating the maximum biomass potential compared to other models, our estimates of mitigation potential under the three tax scenarios might be excessive. Analogously, the cost saving potential of trade found in the cap-and-trade scenario might also be overestimated.
We also test how biomass transportation costs affect the price. We simulate two scenarios, in the first scenario transportation cost are cut by 50% (tcx0.5) while in the second they are doubled 
Conclusions
This paper evaluates the potential of the trade of woody biomass under climate mitigation scenarios.
In particular, we focus on the physical trade of woody biomass used in IGCC power plants combined with CCS (so called BECCS). We examine the characteristics of a potential global market for woody biomass, the impact of trade on biomass demand and on the power mix and the impact of trade on total emissions using three representative carbon tax scenarios. We then test the impact of trade on mitigation costs by assuming that the long-term radiative forcing target obtained by the central value of the carbon tax is attained using a cap-and-trade policy scheme.
Results show that in all scenarios there is big incentive in trading biomass. At least 50% of biomass consumed globally is from the international market. With trade, global biomass consumption increases from 66-90 EJ/yr to 101-147 EJ/yr in 2100, depending on the tax scenario. The effect of biomass trade on climate polices is significant. We show that, under different carbon taxes, biomass trade substantially increases the efficiency of climate policy. Cumulative abatement of GHG emissions over the entire century increases by 120-323 Gt CO 2 depending on the tax scenario. Radiative forcing declines by 0.1-0.3 W/m 2 . This means that achieving a given long-term climate mitigation target with trade of biomass is cheaper. A cap-and-trade policy scheme to achieve the 3.8 W/m 2 radiative forcing target in 2100 costs 14% less, in terms of global discounted output, when trade is available.
We find that the global market of biomass is large both in volume and in value. This generates large financial flows to/from exporting/importing regions. Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, the two largest exporters in our scenarios, receive financial inflows equal to 1-13% and 1.2-14% of their GDP in 2100, respectively. Selling biomass would become a major economic activity of Sub-Saharan Africa. In the highest carbon tax scenario, the transfer to Sub-Saharan Africa would be around 3.5 USD Trillion per year in 2100.
Some of the studies in the literature assume that regions can trade biomass but have never assessed the importance of this option in achieving the mitigation goals nor they have assessed the magnitude of the financial flows triggered by biomass trade.
We show that trading biomass substantially increases the efficiency of climate policy because biomass is unevenly distributed across world regions and it is therefore highly desirable. Limits to trade of biomass would lower welfare in all regions. Therefore, policy makers should reduce trade barriers and should build a sound regulation for a new major commodity market.
There are some limitations in our analysis that need to be discussed.
First, according to GLOBIOM we assume a regional maximum amount of biomass in order to guarantee the carbon neutrality of bio-energy. Our estimates are sensitive to the total maximum potential of biomass. Therefore this study should be replicated using other forestry models. In addition, without a complete integration of WITCH and GLOBIOM we are not able to capture potentially significant feedback of energy and forestland sectors.
Second, we assume that woody biomass can only be used in BECCS power plants and that biomass from crops cannot be used in BECCS power generation.
Finally, we do not assume any governmental support to promote domestic production of bioenergy such as subsidies and we have not set any domestic targets on renewables. In addition, we assume neither barriers nor social and political limitations in trading biomass and acceptability of the BECCS technology. However, energy security and geopolitical issues exist and must be carefully considered.
A Appendix -Model equations
In this Appendix we reproduce the main equations of the WITCH model not presented in the main text. For a full description of the model and calibration details please refer to Bosetti et al. (2006 Bosetti et al. ( , 2007 Bosetti et al. ( , 2009 ). The website www.witchmodel.org contains useful information on the model.
A.1 Final good sector
Output is produced by combining a capital-labor intermediate input with energy services (ES) in a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function:
Y f g (n, t) = ψ(n, t) α f g (n) K g (n, t) ζ L(n, t)
1−ζ ρ f g + (1 − α(n))ES(n, t)
Total factor productivity ψ evolves exogenously with time. The labor force is set equal to population (L), which evolves exogenously. Capital (K g ) evolves as follows:
K g (n, t + 1) = K(n, t)(1 − δ g ) + I(n, t), (A.2) where δ is the sector-specific depreciation rate of capital. The price of K g is normalized to one.
Energy services are a CES aggregate of energy (EN ) and of a stock of knowledge (K rd ):
ES(n, t) = [α rd (n)K rd (n, t) ρes + α en (n)EN (n, t) ρes ] 1/ρes . (A.3) "New ideas" Z rd contribute to the formation of the knowledge stock and are obtained by combining investments I rd with the stock of knowledge already developed in country n and international knowledge spillovers from other countries (Bosetti et al. 2009 ):
Z rd (n, t) = ψ (n, t) K where ψ is a productivity parameter, 0 < a < 1, 0 < b < 1, 0 < c < 1 and a + b + c < 1. In any given period t the marginal cost of 'new ideas' Z increases as I rd increases and reduces the marginal product of R&D to simulate short-term frictions in the R&D market. 24 New ideas are used to build the stock of knowledge capital K rd :
24 Countries that are far from the technology frontier can potentially benefit from a large stock of knowledge: m =n K a rd (m, t) − K a rd (n, t) . However they also have limits in their "absorption capacity": K a rd (n, t) / n K a rd (n, t) .
K rd (n, t + 1) = K rd (n, t) (1 − δ rd ) + Z rd (n, t) . Each input is further decomposed into several sub-components that are aggregated using CES and linear production functions:
EL(n, t) = EL 2 (n, t) + α hydro EL hydro (n, t) , (A.7)
EL 2 (n, t) = α f f (n)F F (n, t) ρ el + α nuclear (n)EL nuclear (n, t) ρ el + α wind (n)EL wind (n, t)
F F (n, t) = [α coal (n)EL c (n, t) ρ f f + α oil (n)El oil (n, t) ρ f f + α gas (n)EL gas (n, t)
EL c (n, t) = [EL coal (n, t) + EL coalccs (n, t) + EL beccs (n, t)] .
(A.10)
Non-electric energy is obtained by linearly adding coal and traditional biomass and an oil-gasbio-fuels (OGB) aggregate. The use of coal in non-electric energy production is quite small and limited to a few world regions, and is thus assumed to decrease exogenously over time in the same fashion as traditional biomass. The price of traditional biomass is assumed to be zero because it is traded in the informal market. The NEL aggregate is thus:
N EL(t, n) = F nel,coal + F nel,tradbio + OGB(t, n); (A.11) OGB(t, n) = τ oil F nel,oil (t, n) ρ ogb + τ gas F nel,gas (t, n) ρ ogb + τ biof uel F 
A.2 Oil Sector
Crude oil is used both in the electric and in the non-electric sector in WITCH. The total oil demand F oil (t, n) is given by the sum of oil used in the electric sector F el,oil (t, n) and non-electric F f g,oil (t, n):
F oil (t, n) = F el,oil (t, n) + F f g,oil (t, n) .
(A.13)
Firms in the oil sector extract oil using eight different technologies, depending on the oil type (from light crude oil to extra heavy tar sands) indexed with v ∈ V {1, ..., 8}. Total production of oil is:
Q oil (t, n) = v Q oil (t, n, v) .
(A.14)
Oil production in a given year cannot exceed the extraction capacity OIL cap (t, n) cumulatively built in the country. Extraction capacity depreciates at the rate δ:
Q oil (t, n, v) ≤ OIL cap (t, n, v) ; (A.15)
OIL cap (t + 1, n, v) = OIL cap (t, n, v) (1 − δ) + I oilcap (t, n, v)/φ(t, n, v); (A.16) where φ(t, n, v) is the investment cost in extraction capacity for oil of type v. Further details on the oil cost function are provided in Massetti and Sferra (2010) .
An upper bound to cumulative oil production constraints extraction below feasible level: 
